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| INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION |
INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (``THE CONVENTION''),
ADOPTED AND OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) AT CARACAS, VENEZUELA, ON MARCH
29, 1996. THE CONVENTION WAS SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES ON JUNE 27,
1996, AT THE TWENTY-SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
MEETING IN PANAMA CITY, PANAMA
April 1, 1998.--Convention was read the first time and, together with
the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
The White House, April 1, 1998.
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the
Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption (``the Convention''), adopted and
opened for signature at the Specialized Conference of the
Organization of American States (OAS) at Caracas, Venezuela, on
March 29, 1996. The Convention was signed by the United States
on June 27, 1996, at the twenty-seventh regular session of the
OAS General Assembly meeting in Panama City, Panama. In
addition, for the information of the Senate, I transmit the
report of the Department of State with respect to the
Convention.
The Convention was the first multilateral Convention of its
kind in the world to be adopted. The provisions of the
Convention are explained in the accompanying report of the
Department of State. The report also sets forth proposed
understandings that would be deposited by the United States
with its instrument of ratification. The Convention will not
require implementing legislation for the United States.
The Convention should be an effective tool to assist in the
hemispheric effort to combat corruption, and could also enhance
the law enforcement efforts of the States Parties in other
areas, given the links that often exist between corruption and
organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking. The
Convention provides for a broad range of cooperation, including
extradition, mutual legal assistance, and measures regarding
property, in relation to the acts of corruption described in
the Convention.
The Convention also imposes on the States Parties an
obligation to criminalize acts of corruption if they have not
already done so. Especially noteworthy is the obligation to
criminalize the bribery of foreign government officials. This
provision was included in the Convention at the behest of the
United States negotiating delegation. In recent years, the
United States Government has sought in a number of multilateral
fora to persuade other governments to adopt legislation akin to
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This Convention
represents a significant breakthrough on that front and should
lend impetus to similar measures in other multilateral groups.
I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable
consideration to the Convention, and that it give its advice
and consent to ratification, subject to the understandings
described in the accompanying report of the Department of
State.
William J. Clinton.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, March 24, 1998.
The President,
The White House.
The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with a
view to its transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(``the Convention''), adopted and opened for signature at the
Specialized Conference on Corruption of the Organization of
American States (OAS) in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 29, 1996.
The Convention was signed by the United States on June 27,
1996, at the twenty-seventh regular session of the General
Assembly of the OAS meeting in Panama City, Panama. I recommend
that the Convention be transmitted to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification.
To date, twenty-three states have signed the Convention.
Eight states (Paraguay, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Argentina) have deposited their
instruments of ratification. The Convention entered into force
on March 6, 1997.
The Convention is the first instrument of its kind in the
world to be adopted. It establishes a treaty-based regime of
obligations among the OAS member states to combat corruption,
including various forms of cooperation analogous to those that
exist pursuant to a number of multilateral law enforcement
treaties to which the United States is a party. The Convention
will enhance the United States' ability to cooperate with, and
receive assistance from, other countries in the hemisphere in
connection with efforts to prevent, investigate, and prosecute
acts of corruption. The Convention will not require implementing legislation for the United States. As further discussed below, the existing bodies of laws and regulations in the United States will be adequate to satisfy the Convention's provisions regarding requirements for legislation, and the other provisions contained in the Convention are self-executing and will not require additional implementing legislation.
The Convention consists of a preamble and twenty-eight
articles. Article 1 (``Definitions'') defines the following
terms: ``public function,'' ``public official,'' ``government
official,'' ``public servant'' and ``property.'' With respect
to the definitions of the first four of the terms listed above,
it was agreed by the negotiators that the term ``at any level
of its hierarchy'', which iscontained in such definitions, was
intended to clarify the ``vertical'' scope of application of the
Convention; i.e., that the Convention would cover officials ranging
from those at the very top of the government bureaucracy, such as
Cabinet-level officials, to those at the lowest levels, such as clerks.
The phrase was included at the behest of certain delegations who
expressed concern that some of the corruption laws that exist in their
countries do not reach officials at the very top levels of government,
or, alternatively, those at the lowest levels.
However, the negotiators expressly discussed and understood
that the phrase ``at any level of its hierarchy'' was not
intended in this Convention to define the scope of application
of the Convention with respect to constituent units of federal
states, nor was the Convention as a whole intended to impose
obligations with respect to the conduct of state or local
officials. To emphasize this point, upon conclusion of the
negotiations at the final session of the specialized conference
in Caracas, the head of the U.S. negotiating team read the
following statement into the record:
The U.S. would like to reaffirm for the record the
statement made earlier by the President of the Working
Group for the article on definitions that the
conclusions of the Working Group reflect the fact that
countries with federal systems of government may not be
able to bind their states and municipalities to the
obligations under the Convention.
This statement was seconded at the conference by the
delegation from Canada and from other States with federal
systems. To confirm our understanding on this point, I
recommend that the following understanding to Article I be
included in the United States instrument of ratification:
The Government of the United States of America
understands that the phrase ``at any level of its
hierarchy'' in the first and second subparagraphs of
Article 1 refers, in the case of the United States, to
all levels of the hierarchy of the federal government
of the United States, and that the Convention does not
impose obligations with respect to the conduct of
officials other than federal officials.
Article II (``Purposes'') describes the purposes of the
Convention, which are to promote and strengthen the development
by each of the States Parties of the necessary mechanisms to
prevent, detect, punish, and eradicate corruption; and to
promote, facilitate, and regulate cooperation among the States
Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions
against corruption in the performance of public functions and
acts of corruption specifically related to such performance.
Article III (``Preventive Measures'') sets forth a list of
measures that the States Parties ``agree toconsider the
applicability of '' within their own institutional systems, for the
purpose of advancing the goals specified in Article II. These include
measures to ``create, maintain, and strengthen,'' inter alia, the
following: standards of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper
fulfillment of public functions and mechanisms to enforce such
standards; instruction to government personnel to ensure proper
understanding of their responsibilities and ethical rules; systems for
registering the income, assets and liabilities of government officials;
open, equitable, and efficient systems of government hiring and
procurement of goods and services; government revenue collection and
control systems that deter corruption; laws that deny favorable tax
treatment for expenditures made in violation of anti-corruption laws;
systems for protecting public servants and citizens who, in good faith,
report acts of corruption; oversight bodies to implement modern anti-
corruption mechanisms; and deterrents to the bribery of domestic and
foreign government officials, such as requirements for publicly held
companies and other types of associations to maintain books and records
that accurately reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and
to have sufficient internal accounting controls.
Article IV (``Scope'') states that the Convention is
applicable provided that the alleged act of corruption has been
committed, or has effects, in a State Party.
Article V (``Jurisdiction'') enunciates obligations imposed
on the States Parties to establish their jurisdiction over
offenses covered under the Convention. Specifically, this
Article obligates each State Party to adopt such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention
when the offense in question is committed in its territory. The
Article also obligates each State Party to establish
jurisdiction over covered offenses by individuals who are in
its territory but whom it declines to extradite on the grounds
of the nationality of the alleged criminal. In addition, the
Article enables, but does not require, each State Party to
establish jurisdiction over offenses covered by the Convention
when such offenses are committed by its nationals or persons
who habitually reside in its territory. Finally, the Article
makes clear that this Convention does not preclude the
application of any other rule of criminal jurisdiction
established by a State Party under its domestic law.
Article VI (``Acts of Corruption'') is one of the key
provisions of the treaty, as it specifies the acts of
corruption to which the Convention applies. In summary terms,
such acts are: the solicitation or acceptance by, or the
offering or granting to, government officials of bribes or
benefits in exchange for any act or omission in the performance
of his public functions; any act or omission by a government
official in the discharge of his duties for the purpose of
illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party;
the fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any
of the acts contemplated in this Article; and participation in
the commission of, attempt to commit, or any association or
conspiracy to commit, any such acts. The Article also renders
the Convention applicable with respect to any other act of
corruption as agreed to between or among two or more States
Parties.
Article VII (``Domestic Law'') requires that the States
Parties, to the extent they have not yet done so, adopt the
necessary legislative or other measures to establish as
criminal offenses under their domestic law the acts of
corruption described in Article VI, as well as to facilitate
cooperation among themselves pursuant to the Convention.
At various times during the negotiations, the U.S.
delegation described the extensive network of laws already in
place in the U.S. that address the various acts of corruption
covered under theConvention. Based on the discussions held at
the negotiating sessions, the U.S. negotiators do not believe that it
is the expectation of any of the other negotiating delegations that the
United States would be required to enact any laws beyond those that it
already has in place. Indeed, the opinion was voiced that one of the
objectives of the Convention is to have the rest of the nations of the
hemisphere develop a body of laws on corruption comparable to that
which exists in the United States.
There is, however, no single federal anti-corruption law in
the United States that uses exactly the terms used in this
Convention. Moreover, the network of United States anti-
corruption laws is extensive, but not every federal employee is
subject to criminal prosecution for every act that could
conceivably fall within the definition of the ``acts of
corruption'' in the Convention. In particular, there is no
general ``attempt'' statute in U.S. federal criminal law,
although federal statutes make ``attempts'' criminal in
connection with specific crimes. The practical effect of this,
however, is debatable. The ``acts of corruption'' described in
Article VI (1) (a) and (b) are defined in such a way as
effectively to embrace the acts constituting an attempt within
the crime since it is the mere solicitation, acceptance,
offering or granting of a bribe which is a crime, without any
consummation of an act of bribery or even an agreement to
bribe. The literal terms of subparagraph (c), on the other
hand, would embrace a situation in which an individual took
some preparatory action unknown to anyone, with the ``purpose''
of profiting illicitly at some future point. Under U.S. law,
this would not be criminalized as such, although the conduct in
question in a given case might well be prosecutable in the
context of some other crime. It should also be noted, with
respect to subparagraph (e), that the reference to
``instigator'' is not intended to require the United States to
create a new crime of association denominated ``instigation,''
but rather was included in the Convention merely as an
illustrative form of the types of ``participation'' that the
provision intends to cover. Although the U.S. legal system does
not recognize the offense of ``instigation'' as such, it does
contemplate equivalent but differently denominated offenses,
such as aiding or abetting.
Despite the above, the existing network of laws in place in
the United States can reasonably be deemed to satisfy the
obligations imposed under the Convention with respect to the
enactment of legislation. During the negotiations, the U.S.
delegation provided considerable information toother
delegations on the nature and content of U.S. law, and it was the
understanding of all delegations that Article VII would not be
understood to require new legislation in the U.S. substituting the
broad wording of Article VI for specific U.S. laws currently in place.
In light of the foregoing, I recommend that the following
understanding to Article VII be included in the United States
instrument of ratification:
Article VII of the Convention sets forth an
obligation to adopt legislative measures to establish
as criminal offenses the acts of corruption described
in Article VI(1). There is an extensive network of laws
already in place in the United States that criminalize
a wide range of corrupt acts. Although United States
laws may not in all cases be defined in terms or
elements identical to those used in the Convention, it
is the understanding of the United States, with the
caveat set forth below, that the kinds of official
corruption which are intended under the Convention to
be criminalized would in fact be criminal offenses
under U.S. law. Accordingly, the United States does not
intend to enact new legislation to implement Article
VII of the Convention.
There is no general ``attempt'' statute in U.S.
federal criminal law. Nevertheless, federal statutes
make ``attempts'' criminal in connection with specific
crimes. This is of particular relevance with respect to
Article VI(1)(c), which by its literal terms would
embrace a single preparatory act done with the
requisite ``purpose'' of profiting illicitly at some
future time, even though the course of conduct is
neither pursued, nor in any sense consummated. The
United States will not criminalize such conduct per se,
although we would expect significant acts of corruption
in this regard to be generally subject to prosecution
in the context of one or more other crimes.
Article VIII (``Transnational Bribery'') obligates the
States Parties, subject to their Constitutions and the
fundamental principles of their legal system, to prohibit and
punish the offering or granting of a bribe, directly or
indirectly, by its nationals, residents, and businesses
domiciled there, to a government official of another State in
connection with any economic or commercial transaction in
exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that
official's public functions. This Article was included at the
behest of the United States, and was intended to obligate the
States Parties to have in place legislation similar to the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
There are small differences, however, between the wording
of Article VIII and that of the FCPA, and a literal reading of
Article VIII could suggest that the U.S. would need to revise
its laws in some respects to comply with the obligations
imposed in the Article. For example, the FCPA specifically
excepts from coverage ``facilitating payments,'' i.e., small
gratuities sometimes paid to foreign government officials to
secure or expedite performance of routine government action.
See Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1(b) and 78dd-
2(b). Article VIII, however, contains no such exception. Also,
the FCPA applies only to payments made to obtain or retain
business, while Article VIII requires criminalization of all
payments made ``in connection with any economic or commercial
transaction,'' an arguably larger universe. Since Article VIII
was included at the behest of the U.S. in order to require
other OAS states to enact laws similar to the FCPA, none of the
negotiating delegations expected that the U.S. itself would
enact new legislation to comply with Article VIII.
In order to be clear on the scope of the U.S. commitment
under Article VIII, I recommend that the following
understanding be included in the United States instrument of
ratification:
With respect to Article VIII, the Government of the
United States of America notes that current United
States law provides criminal sanctions for
transnational bribery. It is the understanding of the
Government of the United States of America that no
additional legislation is needed for the United States
to comply with the obligation imposed in Article VIII.
Article IX (``Illicit Enrichment'') is structurally
analogous to Article VIII, and was included at the insistence
of a number of the Latin American nations. The Article refers
to the offense known as ``illicit enrichment,'' which is
defined as a significant increase in the assets of a
governmentofficial that such official cannot reasonably explain in
relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of his
functions. Like Article VIII, compliance with the obligations imposed
under this Article is subject to each State's Constitution and
fundamental legal principles.
Although there is no offense of ``illicit enrichment'' as
such in U.S. law, there are a number of laws and regulations in
the United States that penalize the same substantive conduct
which this article is intended to reach and which is proscribed
by the ``illicit enrichment'' laws that exist in some nations.
However, in an illicit enrichment statute of the sort
contemplated by the statute, the defendant must bear the burden
of establishing the legitimate origin of the assets in
question. The Article therefore by its terms calls for States
Parties to make the described conduct criminal without
requiring an affirmative showing by the State of wrongdoing on
the part of the defendant. Since under the U.S. legal system
the State must in all cases affirmatively prove that an
individual has engaged in wrongdoing before it can impose
criminal sanctions on such person, compliance with the literal
terms of Article IX would impose on the United States an
obligation that would be inconsistent with its Constitution and
the fundamental principles of its legal system.
Accordingly, the explicit exception contained in Article
IX, which renders compliance with the obligation therein
subject to each State's ``Constitution and the fundamental
principles of its legal system,'' is applicable to the United
States.
This interpretation is consistent with that which was
voiced by the U.S. delegation during the negotiations, and
which was understood by the other delegations. The negotiators
discussed Article IX in detail, and understood that the Article
would not require the United States to enact new legislation.
To emphasize this point, at the final session of negotiations,
the head of the U.S. negotiating delegation read the following
statement for the record:
I stress that we remain perfectly happy to offer
assistance and cooperation to those OAS states that
have enacted illicit enrichment legislation. However,
we do wish to reiterate . . . that we may be unable to
adopt such legislation ourselves for constitutional
reasons. In addition, we may be obliged to take a
reservation to this article because our legislature may
not wish to adopt such legislation for reasons
unrelated to constitutional law or ``fundamental
principles,'' such as the fact that we deal with this
issue fully through other laws already in force.
The other delegations accepted this statement, and no
objections or dissenting views were voiced.
In order to leave no doubt about the scope of the U.S.
commitment under Article IX, I recommend that the following
understanding regarding Article IX be included in the United
States instrument of ratification:
Article IX obligates the States Parties, subject to
the Constitution and fundamental legal principles of
their respective legal systems, to establish as an
offense the act of ``illicit enrichment,'' as defined
in the Article. With respect to this Article, the
Government of the United States of America believes
that the establishment of such an offense would be
inconsistent with the United States Constitution and
the fundamental principles of the United States legal
system. The United States therefore understands that
Article IX does not require the United States to
establish a new criminal offense of illicit enrichment.
However, the United States intends to provide
assistance pursuant to the Convention in accordance
with this Article, to the extent permitted by its
domestic law.
Article X (``Notification'') obligates those States Parties
that adopt legislation regarding transnational bribery or
illicit enrichment to notify the OAS Secretary General, who in
turn shall notify the other States Parties. The Article further
specifies that, for a State Party that makes such a
notification, the crimes of transnational bribery and illicit
enrichment shall be considered acts ofcorruption, for purposes
of the Convention, thirty days following the date of notification.
Article XI (``Progressive Development'') lists a number of
acts the criminalization of which the States Parties ``view as
desirable and undertake to consider'' so as to foster the
development and harmonization of their domestic legislation and
the attainment of the purposes of the Convention. Such acts
include the improper use by a government official of classified
or confidential information, or of property belonging to the
State or to any firm or institution in which the State has a
proprietary interest; any act or omission by any person who
seeks to obtain a decision from a public authority to obtain
illicitly a benefit or gain for herself or for another person;
and the improper diversion to an independent agency or to an
individual by a government official of any property, funds, or
securities belonging to the State, that such official has
received by virtue of his position for purposes of
administration, custody, or for other reasons. The Article
further states that, for those States Parties that have
established these offenses, such offenses shall be considered
acts of corruption for the purposes of the Convention. Any
State Party that has not established these offenses shall,
insofar as its laws permit, provide assistance and cooperation
with respect to these offenses as provided in the Convention.
Article XII (``Effect on State Property'') clarifies that
it shall not be a requirement for application of the Convention
that the acts of corruption harm State property.
Article XIII (``Extradition'') sets forth standard
provisions on extradition which are found in other multilateral
treaties on law enforcement matters. The Article applies to the
offenses established by the States Parties in accordance with
the Convention. It states that each of the offenses to which
this Article applies shall be deemed to be included as
extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing
between or among the States Parties. Morever, the States
Parties undertake to include such offenses as extraditable
offenses in every extradition treaty to be concluded in the
future. The Article also provides that, if a State Party makes
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty, it may
consider the Convention as a legal basis for extradition to a
State with which it does not have an extradition treaty, with
respect to any offense to which the Article applies. In
addition, the Article establishes that States Parties that do
not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty
shall recognize offenses to which the Article applies as
extraditable offenses between themselves.
Article XIII further provides that extradition shall be
subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the
Requested State or by applicable extradition treaties,
including the grounds on which the Requested State may refuse
extradition. If extradition for an offense to which this
Article applies is refused solely on the basis of the
nationality of the person sought, the Parties are obligated to
submit the case to their authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, unless otherwise agreed with the Requesting State.
Finally, this Article enables the Requested State, when the
circumstances so warrant and are urgent, to take into custody a
person whose extradition is sought or take other appropriate
measures to ensure such person's presence at extradition
proceedings.
Article XIV (``Assistance and Cooperation'') contains
obligations regarding mutual legal and technical assistance. It
stipulates that, in accordance with their domestic laws and
applicable treaties, the States Parties shall afford one
another the widest measure of mutual assistance by processing
requests from law enforcement authorities of other States
Parties, for the purpose of obtaining evidence and taking other
necessary action to facilitate legal proceedings and
measuresregarding the investigation or prosecution of acts of
corruption. The Article further provides that the States Parties
provide to each other the widest measures of mutual technical
cooperation on the most effective ways and means of preventing,
detecting, investigating, and punishing acts of corruption. This
provision also requires the States Parties to foster exchanges of
experiences by way of agreements and meetings between competent bodies
and institutions, with special attention to methods and procedures of
citizen participation in the fight against corruption.
Article XV (``Measures Regarding Property'') stipulates
that the States Parties are to provide to each other, in
accordance with their domestic laws and applicable treaties or
agreements, the broadest possible measure of assistance in the
identification, tracing, freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of
property or proceeds obtained, derived from, or used in, the
commission of corruption offenses. The Article also directs
each State Party that enforces its own or another State Party's
forfeiture judgment to dispose of property or proceeds related
to corruption offenses in accordance with its laws. Finally,
the Article contains an asset-sharing clause, which provides
that each State Party may, to the extent permissible under its
laws, transfer all or part of forfeited property or proceeds to
any other State Party that assisted in the underlying
investigation or proceedings.
Article XVI (``Bank Secrecy'') provides that the Requested
State shall not invoke bank secrecy as a basis for refusal to
provide assistance sought under the Convention by the
Requesting State. The Article states that the Requested State
shall apply this Article in accordance with its domestic law,
procedural provisions, or international agreements with the
Requesting State. The Article also provides that the Requesting
State shall be obligated not to use any information received
that is protected by bank secrecy for any purpose other than
the proceeding for which the information was requested, unless
authorized by the Requested State.
Article XVII (``Nature of the Act'') provides that, for
purposes of Articles XIII-XVI of the Convention, the fact that
the property obtained or derived from an act of corruption was
intended for political purposes, or that it is alleged that the
act of corruption was committed for political motives or
purposes, shall not suffice in and of itself for the act to
qualify as a political offense or as a common offense related
to a political offense.
Article XVIII (``Central Authorities'') establishes that,
for the purposes of international assistance and cooperation
provided under the Convention, each State Party may designate a
central authority or may rely upon such central authorities as
are provided for in any relevant treaties or other agreements.
The central authorities shall be responsible for making and
receiving the requests for assistance and cooperation under the
Convention. Because in the United States there are numerous
agencies that may have authority over a particular corruption
matter, the U.S. negotiating team proposed that the designation
of a central authority be rendered optional. It is expected
that the U.S. agency designated as the central authority for
our mutual legal assistance treaties (the Department of
Justice) shall be the central authority in connection with
requests for mutual legal assistance relating to corruption
issues. Other types of requests will be handled by the
appropriate agency in the U.S. with responsibility for that
particular matter or type of request.
Article XIX (``Temporal Application'') provides that,
subject to the constitutional principles and domestic laws of
each State, and to the existing treaties between the States
Parties, the fact that the alleged act of corruption was
committed before this Convention entered into force shall not
preclude procedural cooperation in criminal matters between the
States Parties. The Article clarifiesthat this provision shall
not affect the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law, nor
shall application of this provision interrupt existing statutes of
limitations relating to crimes committed prior to the date of entry
into force of the Convention.
Article XX (``Other Agreements or Practices'') states that
no provision of the Convention shall be construed as preventing
the States Parties from engaging in mutual cooperation within
the framework of other international agreements, bilateral or
multilateral, that are currently in force or may be concluded
in the future, or pursuant to any other applicable arrangement
or practice.
Article XXI-XXVIII contain the final clauses. Article XXI
(``Signature'') provides that the Convention is open for
signature by the Member States of the OAS. Article XXII
(``Ratification'') states that the Convention is subject to
ratification and that the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the General Secretariat of the OAS. Article
XXIII (``Accession'') provides that the Convention shall remain
open for accession by any other State, and that the instruments
of accession shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of
the OAS.
Article XXIV (``Reservations'') stipulates that the States
Parties may, at the time of adoption, signature, ratification,
or accession, make reservations to the Convention, provided
that each reservation concerns one or more specific provisions
and is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention.
Article XXV (``Entry into Force'') provides that the
Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
following the date of deposit of the second instrument of
ratification. This Article also stipulates that, for each State
ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of
the such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article XXVI (``Denunciation'') states that the Convention
shall remain in force indefinitely, but that any of the States
Parties may denounce it. Any instrument of denunciation must be
deposited with the General Secretariat of the OAS. The
Convention shall cease to be in force for the denouncing State
one year from the date of deposit of the instrument of
denunciation.
Article XXVII (``Additional Protocols'') stipulates that
any State Party may submit for the consideration of other
States Parties meeting at a General Assembly of the OAS
additional draft protocols to the Convention to contribute to
the attainment of the purposes of the Convention. The Article
further provides that each such additional protocol shall
establish the terms for its entry into force and shall apply
only to those States that become Parties to it.
Finally, Article XXVIII (Deposit of Original Instrument'')
states that the original instrument of the Convention, the
English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese texts of which are
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General
Secretariat of the OAS, which shall forward an authenticated
copy of its text to the United Nations Secretariat for
registration and publication. This provision also states that
the General Secretariat of the OAS shall be responsible for
notifying its Member States and the States that have acceded to
the Convention of signatures, of the deposit of instruments of
ratification, accession, or denunciation, and of reservations,
if any.
It is my belief that this Convention would afford
substantial benefits to the United States, and would be
consistent with existing United States legislation. The
Departments of Justice and Commerce, the Office of Government
Ethics, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission join the Department of State in
recommending that the Convention be transmitted to the Senate
at an early date for its advice and consent to ratification,
subject to the understandings described above.
Respectfully submitted,
Strobe TalbottLINK: https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/105th-congress/39/document-text?q={%22search%22%3A[%22paraguay%22]}&overview=closed
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